# DB-backups publiceren zonder privé-informatie van gebruikers bloot te leggen

**URL:** <https://meta.discourse.org/t/publishing-db-backups-without-exposing-users-private-information/177175>\
**Category:** Product Support\
**Created:** [25 januari 2021 om 15:14 UTC](https://meta.discourse.org/t/publishing-db-backups-without-exposing-users-private-information/177175 "2021-01-25T15:14:20Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 10

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**Author:** ![riking](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/meta/user_avatar/meta.discourse.org/riking/32/170938_2.png) [@riking](https://meta.discourse.org/u/riking)\
**Post date:** [29 januari 2021 om 00:18 UTC](https://meta.discourse.org/t/publishing-db-backups-without-exposing-users-private-information/177175/10 "2021-01-29T00:18:06Z")

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Another possibility on the horizon is the use of a Augmented [PAKE](https://soatok.blog/2020/04/21/authenticated-key-exchanges/) (Password-Authenticated Key Exchange), so that the password is both practically unrecoverable from the database and never touches the wire.

Unfortunately, they’re all still solidly in the realm of experimental cryptography, and not ready for easy deployment. iOS iCloud sync uses a PAKE.

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